Abstract-In the present work we deal with the concept of jamming with incomplete information about the jammer. We consider two scenarios. In the first one a jammer could be either present in the environment bringing extra background noise or absent. The user has only statistical knowledge about either presence or absence of the jammer. Namely, the user knows that in the environment only a natural background noise could be with probability γ meanwhile with probability 1 − γ a jammer could come into the action distributing an extra noise of the total powerJ among the channels. In the second scenario the user does not know exactly the total jamming power. Namely, the user knows that with probability γ it could beJ 1 and with probability 1 − γ it could beJ 2 . All the problems are modelled as non-zero sum games. The equilibrium strategies are found in closed form.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of jamming plays an important role in ensuring the quality and security of wireless communications, especially at this moment when wireless networks are quickly becoming ubiquitous. The recent literature covers a variety of jamming problems [1] , [3] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [14] , [15] , [16] .
Since jamming can be considered as a game in which a jammer is playing against a user (transmitter) who would like to transmit signal with good quality and at the same time with a reasonable amount of energy, game theory is an appropriate tool for dealing with jamming. Here we investigate the effect of partially available information about the jammer.
As an objective function for the transmitter we consider SINR. To the best of our knowledge, the SINR as an objective function in the power control game was only considered in [2] , [11] . In [11] all users have a single common channel and choose between several base stations. And in [2] the authors has considered the power control game between users, not between a user and a jammer. We note that in the regime of low SINR the present objective can serve as an approximation to the Shannon capacity. A central motivation to consider SINR as an objective function and not Shannon capacity, is that current technology for voice over wireless does not try to achieve Shannon capacity but rather uses given codecs that can adapt the transmission rate to the SINR; these turn out to adapt the rate in a way that is linear in the SINR over a wide range of throughput. The SINR has therefore been used very often to represent directly the throughput see [12] , [13] . The validity of this can be seen e.g. in [10, p. 151, 222 , 239].
As we see from [10, Fig. 10.4, p. 222] , the ratio between the throughput and the SINR is close to a constant throughout long range of bit rates. For example, between 16Kbps and 256Kbps, the maximum variation around the median value is less than 20%.
In the present work we deal with the concept of jamming with incomplete information about the jammer. We consider two scenarios. In the first one a jammer could be either present in the environment bringing extra background noise to the natural one or absent. The user has only statistical knowledge about either presence or absence of the jammer. Namely, the user knows that in the environment only a natural background noise could be with probability γ meanwhile with probability 1−γ a jammer could come into the action distributing an extra noise of the total powerJ among the channels. In the second scenario the user does not know exactly the total jamming power. Namely, he knows that with probability γ it could beJ 1 and with probability 1−γ it could beJ 2 . All the problems are modelled as non-zero sum games. The equilibrium strategies are found in closed form.
It is worth to mention that the considered jamming game relates to resource allocation games which have a lot of application with military flavour (say, Colonel Blotto game [9] or Star War game [8] ) and in search theory [8] . Also, the jamming game principally differs with the game of several cooperative jammers [4] . In the several jammers game their optimal strategies are time-shared meanwhile in the considered game the optimal jammers strategies tell to jam the same set of the channels besides an extra set of the channels which are jammed by bigger expected jamming power.
II. THE USER DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THE JAMMER IS PRESENT OR NOT
In this scenario one user (transmitter) should assign different power levels for different channels to maximize the objective function v. In the environment a jammer could be either present bringing extra background noise to the natural one or absent. The user has only statistical knowledge about either presence or absence of the jammer. Namely, the user knows that in the environment only a natural background noise could be with probability γ meanwhile with probability 1 − γ a jammer could come into the action distributing an extra noise of the total powerJ among the channels. So, the pure strategy of the user is T = (T 1 , . . . , T n ) with
whereT > 0 is the total available power for the user to transmit, n is the number of the channels and T i is the power level assigned for channel i. The strategy of jammer is J = (J 1 , . . . , J n ) with
whereJ > 0 is the total jamming power.
The payoff to the user is his expected SINR, so it is given as follows:
The cost to the jammer is the user SINR, so his payoff is the user SINR taken with negative sign and it is given as follows:
where N 0 is the background noise level and α i > 0 and β i > 0 are fading channel gains of user and jammer for channel i. We will assume that all the fading channel gains α i and β i , the noise level N 0 , the total powersT andJ and the probability γ the jammer comes into action are known to both players.
We shall look for a Nash equilibrium, that is, we want to
where A and B are the sets of all the strategies of the user and the jammer, respectively.
Since the payoff (1) is the linear on T and the payoff (2) is concave on J we can apply a mix of linear and non-linear optimization approaches to get the following result. 
and
It is clear by (4) that the jammer is going to harm only the channels employed by the user for transmission. Then, by (3), the jamming equilibrium strategy has to have the form as follows:
where ω has to be given as the root of the equation
After finding the jamming equilibrium strategy, by (4), we obtain the following relation for the user equilibrium strategy:
Thus,
Summing up the last relation yields:
This jointly with (5) and (6) imply the following result describing the equilibrium in closed form.
Theorem 2:
The game has the unique equilibrium (T, J) where the equilibrium jamming strategy is given as follows
with ω = ω * is the unique root of the following equation in
and the equilibrium user strategy is given as follows:
where
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we present some numerical examples of the equilibrium strategies. We consider the case when the jammer is near with five channels (n = 5). In this scenario α = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), β = (5, 4, 3, 2, 1), N 0 = 1 andT = 10. In Table 1 , 2 and 3 we give strategies of the user and jammer for different value of γ for three cases of the total jamming power, namely, (a) with jamming powerJ = 2 essential smaller the user's power (Table 1) , (b) with jamming powerJ = 7 comparable to the user's power (Table 2 ) and (c) with jamming powerJ = 20 essential larger the user's power (Table 3) . Of course with increasing jamming power more channels become involved in jamming. But with increasing of γ the effect of increasing jamming power on the equilibrium strategies vanishes. In this section we consider the scenario where the user does not know exactly the total jamming power. Namely, he knows that with probability γ it could beJ 1 and with probability 1 − γ it could beJ 2 . This situation can be described as if the user plays with an agent whose nature is unknown. Then we can think that in the environment two jammers are possible with strategies
The payoff to the user is his expected SINR, so it is given as follows
The payoff of the jammer with the total jamming powerJ k , k = 1, 2 is the user's SINR taken with negative sign. So, it is given as follows:
where A and B 1 and B 2 are the sets of all the strategies of the user and the jammer, respectively. Since the payoff (7) is the linear on T and the payoffs (8) is concave on J k we can apply a mix of linear and non-linear optimization approaches to get the following result.
Theorem 3: (T,
Then we have the following result describing the equilibrium Theorem 4:
and i ∈ I 00 with
and i ∈ I 10 with
and i ∈ I 01 with (16) and i ∈ I 11 with
Proof: (a) If T i = 0 then by (10) and ( (9), (10) and (11) implies that
Then, by (17) , (12) holds. Substituting (12) into (18) implies (13) . Since J i > 0 then, by (17) ,
and, by (12) ,
Dividing (19) by (18) and substituting (12) yields
So, i has to satisfy the conditions (20)-(23). Let simplify these conditions. Note that by (20) and (22), the inequalities (21) and (20) are equivalent each other. By (21), (23) can be rewritten in the following equivalent form
Then, i ∈ I 10 follows from (20), (22) and (24). 
Dividing (26) by (27) implies that
Substituting (28) into (25) implies (14) and (15) . Then, (16) follows from (14) and (26). Since J 1 i > 0 and J 2 i > 0, by (14) and (15), we obtain that
Thus, i ∈ I 11 . This completes the proof (d) and Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 implies the following nice properties of the sets I where jammers are going to apply efforts telling that the jammers equilibrium strategy are non-symmetrical.
To find the optimal ω, ν 1 and ν 2 we have to solve the following system of the equations:
Function H 1 J (ω, τ ) has the following properties. It is continuous on ω and τ , it is decreasing on ω and increasing on τ . For a fixed τ > 0 H 1 J (ω, τ ) = 0 for enough big ω and H 1 J (0+, τ ) = ∞. Thus, for a fixed τ > 0 there is
It is clear that ω 1 (τ ) is continuous increasing function such that
where ω =ω 1 is the unique root of the following water-filling equation
Similarly, for a fixed τ > 0 there is ω 2 (τ ) such that
Also, ω 2 (τ ) is continuous increasing function such that
where ω =ω 2 is the unique root of the following water-filling equation
Thus, ω k (1/τ ) for k = 1, 2 is decreasing such that ω k (1/0+) = ∞ and ω k (1/∞) =ω k . Then, we can define
where τ = τ * is the unique root of the equation
Then we obtain the optimal ω = ω * as follows
To get the optimal ν 1 we note that
wherē
So, we can define the optimal ν 1 = ν 1 * as follows
Then, that is clear that
with ν
Thus, we have proved the following theorem describing the equilibrium.
Theorem 6:
The game with uncertainty about the total jamming power has the unique equilibrium where the optimal ω * , ν 1 * and ν 2 * are given by (37), (39) and (40) with τ * is the unique root of (35). Moreover the equilibrium (T, J 1 , J 2 ) has the following form:
0, otherwise, with
V. ALGORITHM
In this section we present an algorithm based on the bisection method and Theorem 6 to find the optimal values of ω, ν 1 , ν 2 and the corresponding optimal solution. Here we assume that is the tolerance of computation and α max = max i α i .
Algorithm: (Return ω * , ν 1 * , ν 2 * and the optimal strategies defined by them) S1:
where where
Sa6: Set
Sa7: Set where
Sb6: Set
where 
VI. BOTH JAMMERS JAM THE SAME CHANNELS
In this Section we consider the case where both jamming strategies applies efforts at all the channels employed by user. Without loss of generality we can assume that the channels are arranged by the user fading channel gains in decreasing order, namely, the following inequalities hold:
Consider the situation where both jamming strategies J 
It implies from (9) that
So,
. Thus, 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In the present work we have dealt with the concept of jamming with incomplete information about the jammer. We considered two scenarios. In the first one a jammer could be either present in the environment bringing extra background noise to the natural one or absent. The user has only statistical knowledge about either presence or absence of the jammer. Namely, it knows that in the environment only a natural background noise could be with probability γ meanwhile with probability 1 − γ a jammer could come into the action distributing an extra noise of the total powerJ among the channels. In the second scenario the user does not know exactly the total jamming power. Namely, he knows that with probability γ it could beJ 1 and with probability 1 − γ it could beJ 2 . All the problems are modelled as non-zero sum games. The equilibrium strategies are found in closed form allowing to trace down how the strategy depend on the probability γ. Finally it is worth to mention that the jamming game principally differs with the game of several cooperative jammers [4] . In the several jammers game their optimal strategies are time-shared meanwhile in the considered game the optimal jammers strategies tell to jam the same set of the channels besides an extra set of the channels which are jammed by bigger expected jamming power.
